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Yogachara (, IAST: ) is an influential tradition of Buddhist philosophy and psychology emphasizing the study of cognition, perception, and consciousness through the interior lens of meditation, as well as philosophical reasoning (hetuvidyā). Yogachara was one of the two most influential traditions of Mahayana in India, along with Madhyamaka.
The compound Yogācāra literally means "practice of yoga", or "one whose practice is yoga", hence the name of the school is literally "the school of the yogins".Jones, Lindsay (Ed. in Chief) (2005). Encyclopedia of Religion. (2nd Ed.) Volume 14: p.9897. USA: Macmillan Reference. (v.14) Yogācāra was also variously termed Vijñānavāda (the doctrine of consciousness), Vijñaptivāda (the doctrine of or percepts) or Vijñaptimātratā-vāda (the doctrine of 'mere representation'), which is also the name given to its major theory of mind which seeks to deconstruct how we perceive the world. There are several interpretations of this main theory: various forms of Idealism, as well as a phenomenology or representationalism. Aside from this, Yogācāra also developed an elaborate analysis of consciousness (vijñana) and mental phenomena (Abhidharma), as well as an extensive system of Buddhist spiritual practice, i.e. yoga.
The movement has been traced to the first centuries of the common era and seems to have evolved as some yogis of the Sarvastivada and Sautrāntika traditions in north India adopted Mahayana. The brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu (both c. 4-5th century CE), are considered the classic philosophers and systematizers of this school, along with the figure of Maitreya.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 146. Yogācāra was later imported to Tibet and East Asia by figures like Shantaraksita (8th century) and Xuanzang (7th-century). Today, Yogācāra ideas and texts continue to be influential subjects of study for Tibetan Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism.
/ref>Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 597. The standard translation of both terms is "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Several modern researchers object to this translation in favor of alternatives like representation-only. The meaning of this term is at the heart of the modern scholarly disagreement about whether Yogacara Buddhism can be said to be a form of idealism (as supported by Garfield, Hopkins, and others) or whether it is definitely not idealist (Anacker, Lusthaus, Wayman).
The term is sometimes used as a synonym with citta-mātra (mere citta), which is also used as a name for the school that suggests Idealism. Schmithausen writes that the first appearance of this term is in the Pratyupanna samadhi sutra, which states "this (or: whatever belongs to this) triple world is nothing but mind (or thought: * cittamatra). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear."Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 598.
Regarding existing Sanskrit sources, the term appears in the first verse of Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā ( Twenty Verses), which states:Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 149.
This world is vijñaptimātra, since it manifests itself as an unreal object ( artha), just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like ( vijñaptimātram evaitad asad arthāvabhāsanāt yathā taimirikasyāsat keśa candrādi darśanam).
According to Mark Siderits, what Vasubandhu means here is that we are only ever aware of mental images or impressions which manifest themselves as external objects, but "there is actually no such thing outside the mind."
The term also appears in Asanga classic work, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (no Sanskrit original, trans. from Tibetan) :
These representations ( vijñapti) are mere representations ( vijñapti-mātra), because there is no corresponding thing/object ( artha)...Just as in a dream there appear, even without a thing/object ( artha), just in the mind alone, forms/images of all kinds of things/objects like visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, houses, forests, land, and mountains, and yet there are no such things/objects at all in that place. MSg II.6Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 389.
Another classic statement of the doctrine appears in Dharmakīrti's Pramanavarttika ( Commentary on Epistemology) which states: "cognition experiences itself, and nothing else whatsoever. Even the particular objects of perception, are by nature just consciousness itself."
The German scholar and philologist Lambert Schmithausen affirms that Yogācāra sources teach a type of idealism which is supposed to be a middle way between Abhidharma realism and what it often considered a nihilistic position which only affirms emptiness as the ultimate.Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 625. Schmithausen notes that philological study of Yogācāra texts shows that they clearly reject the independent existence of mind and the external world.Schmithausen, Lambert (2005). On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng wei shih lun. Tōkyō: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. He also notes that the current trend in rejecting the idealistic interpretation might be related to the unpopularity of idealism among Western academics. Florin Deleanu likewise affirms the idealist nature of Yogācāra texts, while also underscoring how Yogācāra retains a strong orientation to a soteriology which aims at contemplative realization of an ultimate reality that is an ‘inexpressible essence’ ( nirabhilāpyasvabhāva) beyond any subject-object duality.
Similarly, Jonathan Gold writes that the Yogācāra thinker Vasubandhu can be said to be an idealist (similar to Immanuel Kant), in the sense that for him, everything in experience as well as its causal support is mental, and thus he gives causal priority to the mental. At the same time however, this is only in the conventional realm, since "mind" is just another concept and true reality for Vasubandhu is ineffable, "an inconceivable 'thusness' ( tathatā)." Indeed, the Vimśatikā states that the very idea of vijñapti-mātra must also be understood to be itself a self-less construction and thus vijñapti-mātra is not the ultimate truth ( paramārtha-satya) in Yogācāra. Thus according to Gold, while Vasubandhu's vijñapti-mātra can be said to be a “conventionalist idealism”, it is to be seen as unique and different from Western forms, especially Hegelianism Absolute Idealism.
Some scholars like David Kalupahana argue that it is a mistake to conflate the terms citta-mātra (which is sometimes seen as a different, more metaphysical position) with vijñapti-mātra (which need not be idealist).Kalupahana 1992, pp. 122-126, 135-136. However, Deleanu points out that Vasubandhu clearly states in his Twenty Verses and Abhidharmakosha that vijñapti and citta are synonymous. Vasubandhu: cittaṃ mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyaḥ (Viṃś 3.3); ‘mind, thinking, consciousness, and representation are synonymous terms’. Cf. AKBh II.34 (p. 61, l. 20): cittaṃ mano ʼtha vijñānam ekārthaṃ; ‘now, the mind, thinking, and consciousness have the same meaning’. Nevertheless, different alternative translations for vijñapti-mātra have been proposed, such as representation-only, ideation-only, impressions-only and perception-only.Wayman, Alex, A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 447-476.
Alex Wayman notes that one's interpretation of Yogācāra will depend on how the qualifier mātra is to be understood in this context, and he objects to interpretations which claim that Yogācāra rejects the external world altogether, preferring translations such as "amounting to mind" or "mirroring mind" for citta-mātra. For Wayman, what this doctrine means is that "the mind has only a report or representation of what the sense organ had sensed." The representationalist interpretation is also supported by Stefan Anacker.Vasubandhu (author), Stefan Anacker (translator, annotator) (1984). Seven works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist psychological doctor. Issue 4 of Religions of Asia series. Motilal Banarsidass Publ. . Source: 1 (accessed: Wednesday April 21, 2010), p.159
According to Thomas Kochumuttom, Yogācāra is a realistic pluralism which does not deny the existence of individual beings. Kochumuttom argues that Yogācāra is not idealism since it denies that absolute reality is a consciousness, that individual beings are transformations or illusory appearances of an absolute consciousness. Thus, for Kochumuttom, vijñapti-mātra means "mere representation of consciousness," a view which states "that the world as it appears to the unenlightened ones is mere representation of consciousness". Furthermore, according to Kochumuttom, in Yogācāra "the absolute state is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of subject-object distinction. Once thus defined as emptiness ( sunyata), it receives a number of synonyms, none of which betray idealism."
Vasubandhu mentions three key features of experience which are supposed to be explained by matter and refutes them:Williams, 2008, pp. 94-95.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2004, p xxiv.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, pp. 150-151.
According to Mark Siderits, after disposing of these objections, Vasubandhu believes he has shown that mere cognizance is just as good at explaining the relevant phenomena of experience as any theory of realism that posits external objects. Therefore, he then applies the Indian philosophical principle termed the "Principle of Lightness" (Sanskrit: lāghava, which is similar to Occam's Razor) to rule out realism since vijñapti-mātra is the simpler and "lighter" theory which "posits the least number of unobservable entities."Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 157.
Another objection that Vasubandhu answers is that of how one person can influence another's experiences, if everything arises from mental karmic seeds in one's mind stream. Vasubandhu argues that "impressions can also be caused in a mental stream by the occurrence of a distinct impression in another suitably linked mental stream."Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 170. As Siderits notes, this account can explain how it is possible to influence or even totally disrupt (murder) another mind, even if there is no physical medium or object in existence, since a suitably strong enough intention in one mind stream can have effects on another mind stream. From the mind-only position, it is easier to posit a mind to mind causation than to have to explain mind to body causation, which the realist must do. However, Siderits then goes on to question whether Vasubandhu's position is indeed "lighter" since he must make use of multiple interactions between different minds to take into account an intentionally created artifact, like a pot. Since we can be aware of a pot even when we are not "linked" to the potter's intentions (even after the potter is dead), a more complex series of mental interactions must be posited.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 173. Nevertheless, not all interpretations of Yogācāra's view of the external world rely on multiple relations between individual minds. Some interpretations in Chinese Buddhism, such as in Huayan, defended the view of a single shared external world (bhājanaloka) which was still made of consciousness, while some later Indian thinkers like Ratnakīrti (11th century CE) defended a type of Nondualism monism.Brewster, Ernest Billings. "What is Our Shared Sensory World?: Ming Dynasty Debates on Yogacara versus Huayan Doctrines." Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies (2018, 31: 117–170) New Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies. ISSN: 2313-2000 e-ISSN: 2313-2019Wood, Thomas E. Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda, p. 205. University of Hawaii Press, 1991
In disproving the possibility of external objects, Vasubandhu's Vimśatikā similarly attacks Indian theories of atomism and property particulars as incoherent on Mereology grounds.Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Yogācāra expanded the six vijñāna schema into a new system which with two new categories. The seventh consciousness developed from the early Buddhist concept of manas, and was seen as the defiled mentation ( kliṣṭa-manas) which is obsessed with notions of "self". According to Paul Williams, this consciousness "takes the substratum consciousness as its object and mistakenly considers the substratum consciousness to be a true Self."
As noted by Schmithausen, the ālaya-vijñāna, being a kind of vijñāna, has an object as well (as all vijñāna has intentionality). That object is the sentient being's surrounding world, that is to say, the "receptable" or "container" ( bhājana) world. This is stated in the 8th chapter of the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, which states that the ādānavijñāna is characterized by "an unconscious (or not fully conscious?) steady perception (or "representation") of the Receptacle ( *asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti)."Schmithausen, Lambert (1987). Ālayavijñāna: on the origin and the early development of a central concept of Yogācāra philosophy, Part I: Text, page 89. Tokyo, International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series IVa.
The ālaya-vijñāna is also what experiences rebirth into future lives and what descends into the womb to appropriate the fetal material. Therefore, the ālaya-vijñāna's holding on to the body's sense faculties and "profuse imaginings" ( prapañca) are the two appropriations which make up the "kindling" or "fuel" (lit. upādāna) that samsaric existence depends upon. Yogācāra thought thus holds that being unaware of the processes going on in the ālaya-vijñāna is an important element of ignorance ( avidya). The ālaya is also individual, so that each person has their own ālaya-vijñāna, which is an ever changing process and therefore not a permanent self.
According to Williams, this consciousness "seen as a defiled form of consciousness (or perhaps sub- or unconsciousness), is personal, individual, continually changing and yet serving to give a degree of personal identity and to explain why it is that certain karmic results pertain to this particular individual. The seeds are momentary, but they give rise to a perfumed series which eventually culminates in the result including, from seeds of a particular type, the whole ‘inter-subjective’ phenomenal world."Williams, 2008, pp. 97-98. Also, Asanga and Vasubandhu write that the ālaya-vijñāna ‘ceases’ at awakening, becoming transformed into a pure consciousness.Williams, 2008, pp. 98-99.
According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the ālayavijñāna has both a common character and an uncommon character. The common character refers to those seeds which ripen into the bhājanaloka, or container world, which is common to all. On the other hand, its uncommon character refers to those seeds which ripen as an individual's own sense faculties. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that the remedies (i.e. those which comprise the Buddhist path) counteract the uncommon character of the ālayavijñāna, but not that which is common. That is, although they lack any individual karma of their own, purified persons are nonetheless supported by a consciousness of common seeds and that which is sustained by the discriminations of others. And while buddhas have access to that which is shared in common, i.e. the container world, they nonetheless experience it as pure.The Summary of the Great Vehicle, by bodhisattva Asaṅga, translated from the Chinese of Paramārtha (Taishō Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, pages 33-34, Revised Second Edition, Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai and Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2003A Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha and its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, Volume One, translated and introduced by Karl Brunnhölzl, page 175, Tsadra Foundation Series, Snow Lion, an imprint of Shambhala Publications, 2018
The storehouse consciousness also serves as the basis for container worlds that are uninhabited by sentient beings. That is, according to Buddhist cosmology, when a world is going to perish, beings no longer populate it. However, although there are no beings to perceive it, that container world is nonetheless "mind only," as it still exists in the storehouse consciousnesses of the beings who have departed from it. Similarly, in the case of an uninhabited world in which beings are yet to be reborn, such a world also exists in the storehouse consciousnesses of those beings who will be reborn there. As Thomas Wood explains, this means that a world may exist entirely within the minds of sentient beings even though those beings are not directly conscious of it.Wood, Thomas. Mind Only: a Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda, pages 169-170, University of Hawai'i Press, 1991.
According to Waldron, while there were various similar concepts in other Buddhist Abhidharma schools which sought to explain karmic continuity, the ālaya-vijñāna is the most comprehensive and systematic.Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, page 131. Waldron notes that the ālaya-vijñāna concept was probably influenced by these theories, particularly the Sautrantika theory of seeds and Vasumitra's theory of a subtle form of mind (suksma-citta).Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, page 93.
Regarding the status of the seeds, according to the Chengweishilun, Sthiramati regarded the seeds to be merely nominal (i.e. conventional and not actually real); while on the other hand, Xuanzang took them to be real.Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, Part 1, pages 224-225. (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing HouseThree Texts on Consciousness Only, translated by Francis Cook, page 44, Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai and BDK America, 1999
A similar perspective which emphasizes Yogācāra's continuity with early Buddhism is given by Walpola Rahula. According to Rahula, all the elements of this theory of consciousness with its three layers of vijñāna are already found in the Pāli Canon, corresponding to the terms viññāna (sense cognition), manas (mental function, thinking, reasoning, conception) and citta (the deepest layer of the aggregate of consciousness which retains karmic impressions and the defilements).Padmasiri De Silva, Robert Henry Thouless, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Third revised edition published by NUS Press, 1992 page 66.Walpola Rahula, quoted in Padmasiri De Silva, Robert Henry Thouless, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Third revised edition published by NUS Press, 1992 page 66, [3].
Schmithausen observes that, according to the Chengweishi lun, the sense of a surrounding world of things experienced in common by different beings is a result of their taking the images produced in each other's ālayavijñāna as "remote objective supports." That is, on the basis of the remote objective support (i.e. the mental representation in another's mind), one's own mind develops a corresponding image. As the Chengweishi lun states, "the invariably has also a remote objective support because it must rely on an ‘original’ (質) consisting developed by the others (他變): only then it develops its own image," and "one's own body and others' bodies as well as the earth (i.e. the surrounding world) can be mutually experienced only because the corresponding developed by the others function as the original of one's own mind,."Schmithausen, Lambert. On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng wei shih lun. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series XIII, pages 38-40. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies 2015, Tokyo.
The remote objective support constitutes a specific type of condition, namely "the condition of dominance" ( adhipati-pratyaya). Regarding this, Zhizhou, a grand pupil of Xuanzang disciple Kuiji, states: "That which has been developed from the a given sentient being serves directly ( sākṣāt) for him as a cognitive object. That which has been developed from the another constitutes a condition of dominance ( adhipati-pratyaya) for that which has been developed from his own consciousness; it thus also serves remotely as a cognitive object." Zhizhou goes on to explain that what is developed from one's own consciousness is "that which is conformed to," while what is developed from another's consciousness is "that which conforms to." In the example of a person cutting down a tree, when the tree in that person's mind (that which is conformed to) is cut down, the tree in the consciousness of another (that which conforms to) is also cut down. In this way, "that which conforms to" exists in mutual relationship with "that which is conformed to." As such, when the latter is absent, so too is the former.Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, Part 1, page 60 (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House.
Dharmakirti makes a distinction between two types of causes depending on whether one's mental impressions are caused by one's own mind or caused by another’s mind. In the former case, the cause is referred to as upādāna kāraṇa (material cause), while in the latter case the cause is the adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). The dominant condition is involved when "the impressions of one person's mind stream are causally related to the mind-cause of another person's mind stream." According to Dharmakīrti, one's perceptions of one's own bodily actions and speech are caused directly by one's own mind as the material cause. On the other hand, the image of one's body and speech in another person's consciousness, though directly caused by their mind, is simultaneously influenced by one's own mind serving as the dominant condition, adhipati-pratyaya.Wood, Thomas. Mind Only: a Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda, pages 213-214, University of Hawai'i Press, 1991.
For Xuanzang and Kuiji, adhipati-pratyaya served to defend Yogācāra against the charge of solipsism, the view that other minds do not exist. That is, as a remote objective support, adhipati-pratyaya preserves the alterity of other minds, which are not the products of one's own inner psyche. As such, other minds are not negated. On the other hand, being the remote objective supports of one's own consciousness means that other minds are nonetheless perceived and thus do not violate the principle of mind-only. That is, other minds are not extra-mental but depend on one's own.Jessica X. Zu. Adhipati, Yogācāra Intersubjectivity, and Soteriology in Kuiji’s Commentaries. Sophia (2025), Volume 64, pages 302-306. According to Jessica Zu, "In this framing of intersubjectivity, the problem of one world or many worlds is explained non dualistically: these lifeworlds are neither the same nor different, neither one nor many, but karmically interconnected."Jessica X. Zu. Adhipati, Yogācāra Intersubjectivity, and Soteriology in Kuiji’s Commentaries. Sophia (2025), Volume 64, page 291. This self-other interdependence also has soteriological implications, as it enables ordinary beings to learn from sages who in turn assist those who may purify their minds by taking up the path to liberation.Jessica X. Zu. Adhipati, Yogācāra Intersubjectivity, and Soteriology in Kuiji’s Commentaries. Sophia (2025), Volume 64, page 303.
The "progressive model" meanwhile can be found in the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its bhāṣya. In this model, it is the perfected nature which is the primary element of the three natures schema. Here, the perfected nature is the pure basis of reality, while the other two natures are both impaired by ignorance.D’AMATO, M. “THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGĀCĀRA ‘TRISVABHĀVA’-THEORY.” Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185–207. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23497001. Accessed 16 Feb. 2024. As the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa states: "The imputed and the other-dependent are to be known as having defiled characteristics. The perfected is asserted to have the characteristic of purity." In this text, the dependent nature is seen as something which must be abandoned since it has the "appearance of duality" (dvayākāra). As such, in this "progressive" model, the dependent nature is the basis for the imagined nature, but not the basis for the perfected nature. The perfected nature on the other hand is a fundamentally pure true reality (which nevertheless is covered by adventitious defilements). As the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra states:
Another difference between these sources is that in the Triṃśikā, the main model of liberation is a radical transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti). The Trisvabhāvanirdeśa meanwhile claims that liberation occurs through knowledge of the three natures as they are (in their non-duality). Some scholars, like McNamara, argue that these two models are incompatible, Ontology and Soteriology. Kapstein thinks that it is possible that the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa is attempting to reconcile them. These differences have also led some scholars (Kapstein and Thomas Wood) to question the attribution of the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa to Vasubandhu.
These philosophers differed on the question of the relationship of the various divisions of consciousness to the three natures ( trisvabhāva). For Nanda, the seeing part of consciousness belonged to the dependent nature ( paratantra-svabhāva), while the seen part belonged to the imagined ( parikalpita-svabhāva).Bhikku KL Dhammajoti, in Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, Part 1, page 34 (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House. According to Dharmapāla, the seeing part, seen part, and the self-cognizing part all belong to the dependent nature. For Dharmapāla, it is only when false notions are applied to them (such as existence, nonexistence, identity, difference, etc.) that the seeing and seen parts can be called imagined, but they are otherwise real.Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, pages 33, and 847-848 (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House.
While Sthiramati was influenced by Dignāga's three-bhāga theory, he held that the self-cognizing part alone belonged to the dependent nature (with the seeing and seen parts both belonging to the imagined). Thus, for Sthiramati, consciousness really only has one part, and in this he differed from Dharmapāla and Xuanzang.Bhikku KL Dhammajoti, in Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, Part 1, pages 33-34 (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House. According to Zhihua Yao, the one-bhāga theory is associated with the classical Nirākarāvāda position according to which consciousness is not subject to any divisions.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, page 149, Routledge, 2005
An important difference between the Yogācāra conception of emptiness and the Madhyamaka conception is that in classical Yogācāra, emptiness does exist (as a real absence) and so does consciousness (which is that which is empty, the referent of emptiness), while Madhyamaka refuses to endorse such existential statements. The Madhyāntavibhāga for example, states "the imagination of the nonexistent abhūta-parikalpa exists. In it duality does not exist. Emptiness, however, exists in it," which indicates that even though that which is dualistically imagined (subjects and objects), is unreal and empty, their basis does exist (i.e. the dependently arisen conscious manifestation).King, Richard, Early Yogācāra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 pp. 659-683.
The Yogācāra school also gave special significance to the Āgama sutra called Lesser Discourse on Emptiness (parallel to the Pali Cūḷasuññatasutta, MN 121) and relies on this sutra in its explanations of emptiness. According to Gadjin Nagao, this sutra affirms that "emptiness includes both being and non-being. both negation and affirmation."Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyamika and Yogachara. Leslie S. Kawamura, translator, SUNY Press, Albany 1991, pp. 53-57, 200.
While Madhyamaka generally states that asserting the ultimate existence or non-existence of anything (including emptiness) was inappropriate, Yogācāra treatises (like the Madhyāntavibhāga) often assert that the dependent nature ( paratantra-svabhāva) really exists and that emptiness is an actual absence that also exists ultimately.Williams (2008), p. 93. In a similar fashion, Asaṅga states "that of which it is empty does not truly exist; that which is empty truly exists: emptiness makes sense in this way".Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 68. Oxford University Press. . He also describes emptiness as "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self." Classical Yogācāras like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati also affirm the reality of conscious appearance, i.e. that truly existent stream of dependent arisen and constantly changing consciousness which projects false and illusory subjective minds and their cognitive objects. It is this real flow of conscious transformation (vijñānapariṇāma) which is said to be empty (of duality and conceptuality).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? pp. 41-52. Oxford University Press. Against the radically anti-foundationalist interpretation of Madhyamaka, the classic Yogācāra position is that there is something (the dependent nature which is mere-consciousness) that "Existence" (sat) independently of conceptual designation (prajñapti), and that it is this real thing (vāstu) which is said to be empty of duality and yet is a basis for all dualistic conceptions.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 59. Oxford University Press.
Furthermore, Yogācāra thinkers like Asaṅga and Vasubandhu critiqued those who "adhere to non-existence" ( nāstikas, vaināśkas, likely referring to certain Madhyamikas) because they saw them as straying into metaphysical nihilism ( abhāvānta, see Vimśatikā v. 10). They held that there was really something which could be said to "exist", that is, vijñapti, and that was what is described as being "empty" in their system. For Yogācāra, all conventional existence must be based on something which is real (dravya).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 50. Oxford University Press. Sthiramati argues that we cannot say that everything exists conventionally (saṁvṛtisat) or nominally (prajñaptisat) and that nothing truly exists in an ultimate fashion (which would entail a global conventionalism and nominalism without any metaphysical ground). For Sthiramati, this view is false because "what would follow is non-existence even conventionally. That is because conventions are not possible without something to depend upon (or, “without taking up something”—upādāna)."Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 46. Oxford University Press. Thus, for Sthiramati, consciousness (vijñana) "since it is dependently arisen, exists as dravya (Substance theory)."
The Bodhisattvabhūmi likewise argues that it is only logical to speak of emptiness if there is something (i.e. dharmatā, an ultimate nature) that is empty. The Bodhisattvabhūmi's Chapter on Reality ( Tattvārthapaṭala) states that emptiness is "wrongly grasped" by those who "do not accept that of which something is empty, nor do they accept that which is empty". This is because "emptiness holds good only as long as that of which something is said empty does not exist, but on the other hand, that which is empty exists. If, however, all elements were non-existent, in what respect, what would be empty, and of what?" For the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the "right" way to understand emptiness is "one regards that something is empty of that which does not exist in it and correctly comprehends that what remains there does actually exist here". That which "remains" and "actually exists" is the true reality, the thing itself (vastumātra), the foundation (āśraya) which remains (avaśiṣṭa) after all conceptual constructs have been removed.
Yogācārins also criticized certain Madhyamaka accounts of conventional truth, that is, the view which says that conventional truth is merely erroneous cognitive processes (designations, expressions, and linguistic conventions) which project an inherent nature.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 86. Oxford University Press. The Yogācārabhūmi
Yogācārins further held that if all phenomena are equally conventional and unreal in the same way this would lead to laxity in ethics and in following the path, in other words to moral relativism.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 116. Oxford University Press. The basic idea behind this critique is that if only convention exists (as Madhyamaka claims) and there are no truths that are independent of convention and linguistic expression, there would be no epistemic foundations for critiquing worldly (non-buddhist) conventions and affirming other conventions as closer to the truth (like the conventions used by Buddhists to establish their ethics and their teachings).
Madhyamaka thinkers like Bhaviveka, Chandrakirti and Shantideva also critiqued Yogācāra views in their works for what they saw as an improper reification (samāropa) of mind and for a nihilistic denial of conventional truth. The work of Xuanzang (7th century) also contains evidence for this Indian debate.Lusthaus, Dan (undated). Xuanzang (Hsüan-tsang). Source: (accessed: December 12, 2007)
According to Yaroslav Komarovski the distinction is as follows:
For Yogācāra, the seemingly external or dualistic world is merely a "by-product" ( adhipati-phala) of karma. The term vāsanā ("perfuming") is also used when explaining karma. Yogācārins were divided on the issue of whether vāsāna and bija were essentially the same, whether the seeds were the effect of the perfuming, or whether the perfuming simply affected the seeds. The type, quantity, quality and strength of the seeds determine where and how a sentient being will be reborn: one's race, sex, social status, proclivities, bodily appearance and so forth. The conditioning of the mind resulting from karma is called saṃskāra. Vasubandhu's Treatise on Action ( Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa), treats the subject of karma in detail from the Yogācāra perspective. Karmasiddhiprakarana: The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu. translated by Etienne Lamotte and Leo M. Pruden. Asian Humanities Press: 2001 . pg 13, 35
The fifth class of beings, the icchantika, were described in various Mahayana sutras as being incapable of achieving enlightenment, unless in some cases through the aid of a Buddha or Bodhisattva. Nevertheless, the notion was highly criticized by later Mahayanists who supported the universalist doctrine of ekayana. This tension is important in East Asian Buddhist history and later East Asian Yogācārins attempted to resolve the dispute by softening their stance on the five categories.Ford, James L. (2006). Jokei and Buddhist Devotion in Early Medieval Japan. Oxford University Press, USA. pp. 35-68.
The YBh discusses various topics relevant to the bodhisattva practice, including: the eight different forms of dhyāna (meditative absorptions), the three Samadhi, different types of liberation (Moksha), meditative attainments ( samāpatti) such as nirodhasamāpatti, the five hindrances ( Five hindrances), the various types of foci ( ālambana) or 'images' ( nimitta) used in meditation, the various types contemplative antidotes ( pratipakṣa) against the afflictions (like contemplating death, unattractiveness, impermanence, and suffering), the practice of śamatha through "the nine aspects of resting the mind" ( navākārā cittasthitiḥ), the practice of insight ( vipaśyanā), mindfulness of breathing Anapanasati), how to understand the four noble truths, the thirty-seven factors of Awakening ( saptatriṃśad bodhipakṣyā dharmāḥ), the Brahmavihara, and how to practice the six perfections ( pāramitā).Timme Kragh 2013 pp. 51, 60–230
The five paths or stages are outlined in Yogācāra sources as follows:Watanabe, Chikafumi, A Study of Mahayanasamgraha III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories, pp. 40-65. University of Calgary, 2000.
The Bodhisattvabhūmi outlines several practices of bodhisattvas, including the six perfections ( pāramitā), the thirty-seven factors of Awakening, and the Brahmavihara. Two key practices which are unique to bodhisattvas in this text are the four investigations and the four correct cognitions or "the four kinds of understanding in accordance with true reality".Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 893-894.Brunnholzl, Karl (trans.), Asanga. (2019) A Compendium of the Mahayana: Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha and Its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, Appendix 8. Shambhala Publications. These two sets of four practices and cognitions are also taught in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its commentaries.
The four investigations and the corresponding four correct cognitions (which are said to arise out of the investigations) are:Kragh 2013, p. 160.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 894-896.
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Constant co-cognition argument
This argument was defended by Dharmakirti in his Ascertainment of Epistemology ( Pramāṇaviniścaya), which calls it "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: sahopalambhaniyama) . According to Dharmakīrti:Because something is not apprehended without the additional qualification of consciousness, and because blue is apprehended when this qualification is apprehended, consciousness itself has the appearance of blue. There is no external object by itself. (PV 3.335)
According to this argument, any object of consciousness, like blue, cannot be differentiated from the conscious awareness of blue since both are always experienced as one thing. Since we never experience blue without the experience of blue, they cannot be differentiated Empiricism. Furthermore, we cannot differentiate them through an inference either, since this would need to be based on a pattern of past experiences which included the absence or presence of the two elements. Thus, this is a type of epistemological argument for idealism which attempts to show there is no good reason to accept the existence of mind-independent objects.
Soteriological importance of mind-only
Vasubandhu also explains why it is Soteriology important to get rid of the idea of really existing external objects. According to Siderits, this is because:When we wrongly imagine there to be external objects we are led to think in terms of the duality of 'grasped and grasper', of what is 'out there' and what is ' in here' - in short, of external world and self. Coming to see that there is no external world is a means, Vasubandhu thinks, of overcoming a very subtle way of believing in an 'I'... once we see why physical objects can't exist we will lose all temptation to think there is a true ' me' within. There are really just impressions, but we superimpose on these the false constructions of object and subject. Seeing this will free us from the false conception of an 'I'.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 175.
Siderits notes how Immanuel Kant had a similar notion, that is, without the idea of an objective mind independent world, one cannot derive the concept of a subjective "I". But Kant drew the opposite conclusion to Vasubandhu, since he held that we must believe in an enduring subject, and thus, also believe in external objects.
Analysis of Consciousness
Yogācāra gives a detailed explanation of the workings of the mind and the way it constructs the reality we experience. The central Yogācāra theory of mind is that of the eight consciousnesses.
Eight consciousnesses
A key innovation of the Yogācāra school was the doctrine of eight consciousnesses. These "eight bodies of consciousnesses" ( aṣṭa vijñānakāyāḥ) are: the five sense-consciousnesses (of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and bodily sense), mentation (mano or citta), the defiled self-consciousness ( kliṣṭamanovijñāna), and the storehouse or substratum consciousness ( ālayavijñāna).Williams, Paul (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, Routledge, p. 97. Traditional Buddhist descriptions of consciousness taught just the first six vijñānas, each corresponding to a sense base ( ayatana) and having their own sense objects (sounds etc). Five are based on the five senses, while the sixth ( mano-vijñāna), was seen as the surveyor of the content of the five senses as well as of mental content like thoughts and ideas. Standard Buddhist doctrine held that these eighteen "elements" (dhatus), i.e. six external sense bases (smells, sounds etc.), six internal bases (sense organs like the eye, ear, etc.), and six consciousnesses "exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the sensorium." The six consciousnesses are also not substantial entities, but a series or stream of events (dharmas), which arise and vanish very rapidly moment by moment. This is the Abhidharma doctrine of "momentariness" (kṣaṇavada), which Yogācāra also accepts.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2004, p xxv.
Ālaya-vijñāna
The eighth consciousness, ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse or repository consciousness), was defined as the storehouse of all karmic seeds (bīja), where they gradually matured until ripe, at which point they manifested as karmic consequences. Because of this, it is also called the "mind which has all the seeds" ( sarvabījakam cittam), as well as the "basis consciousness" ( mūla-vijñāna) and the "appropriating consciousness" ( ādānavijñāna). According to the Saṅdhinirmocana Sūtra, this kind of consciousness underlies and supports the six types of manifest awareness, all of which occur simultaneously with the ālaya.Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, pp 94-95. William S. Waldron sees this "simultaneity of all the modes of cognitive awareness" as the most significant departure of Yogācāra theory from traditional Buddhist models of vijñāna, which were "thought to occur solely in conjunction with their respective sense bases and epistemic objects".Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, p 97.
Transformations of consciousness
Yogācāra sources do not necessarily describe the eight consciousnesses as absolutely separate or substantial phenomena. For example, Kalupahana notes that the Triṃśika describes the various forms of consciousness as transformations and functions of a being's stream of consciousness. These transformations are threefold according to Kalupahana. The first is the ālaya and its seeds, which is the flow or stream of consciousness, without any of the usual projections on top of it. The second transformation is manana, self-consciousness or "Self-view, self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love". It is "thinking" about the various perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness". The ālaya is defiled by this self-interest. The third transformation is visaya-vijñapti, the " concept of the object". In this transformation the concept of objects is created. By creating these concepts human beings become "susceptible to grasping after the object" as if it were a real object ( sad artha) even though it is just a conception ( vijñapti).
Account of intersubjectivity
Yogācāra has a complex account of intersubjectivity. According to Yogācāra doctrine, sentient beings experience their own mental representations. This means each being, strictly speaking, occupies its own unique sensory world, as Ernest Billings Brewster points out: "every sentient being possesses a 'storehouse consciousness' that contains a sensory world unique to each being."Brewster, Ernest Billings. "What is Our Shared Sensory World?: Ming Dynasty Debates on Yogacara versus Huayan Doctrines." Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies (2018, 31: 117–170) New Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies. ISSN: 2313-2000 e-ISSN: 2313-2019 However, these worlds are not cut off from one another. For Jessica Zu explains that "Yogācāra thinkers take it for granted that sentient beings inhabiting different worlds are nonetheless karmically connected, i.e., that each mental stream supported by their respective karmically entangled ālayavijñāna is inevitably connected with many other mental streams and open to be transformed by other mental streams. It is precisely this karmic connectedness that enables Yogācāra philosophers to conceive the possibility and efficacy of intersubjective interplay across different lifeworlds."Jessica X. Zu. Adhipati, Yogācāra Intersubjectivity, and Soteriology in Kuiji’s Commentaries. Sophia (2025), Volume 64, page 300.
The three natures
Yogācāra works often define three basic modes or "natures" ( Svabhava) of experience. Jonathan Gold explains that "the three natures are all one reality viewed from three distinct angles. They are the appearance, the process, and the emptiness of that same apparent entity." According to Paul Williams, "all things which can be known can be subsumed under these Three Natures." Since this schema is Yogācāra's systematic explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness ( śūnyatā), each of the three natures are also explained as having a lack of own-nature ( niḥsvabhāvatā).Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 176.King, Richard, Early Yogācāra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 PP.659-683. The Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa ( Exposition of the Three Natures) gives a brief definition of these three natures: What appears is the dependent. How it appears is the fabricated. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only fabrication. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there.
In detail, three natures ( trisvabhāva) are:Williams (2008), p. 90.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, pp. 177-178.
Two interpretations of the three natures
Various Buddhist studies scholars such as Alan Spongberg, Mario D'amato, Daniel McNamara, and Matthew T. Kapstein have noted that there are two main interpretations of the three natures doctrine among the various texts of the Yogacara corpus. The two models have been named the "pivot" model and "progressive" model by these Western scholars.McNamara, Daniel (2011). “On the Status of the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa in Contemporary Conceptions of Yogācāra Thought.”Matthew Kapstein. Who Wrote the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa? Reflections on an Enigmatic Text and Its Place in the History of Buddhist Philosophy. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2017. ⟨halshs-02503277⟩ The "pivot" model, found in texts like the Triṃśikā and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, presents the dependent nature as a kind of "ontological pivot" since it is the basis for conceptual construction (the imagined nature) and for the perfected nature (which is nothing but the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature). As such, the imagined nature is an incorrect way of experiencing the dependent, while the perfected nature is the correct way.
Reality - which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible - does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, abandoned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water.
Furthermore, according to the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (TSN 17-20), the three natures are inseparable (abhinna) and as such non-dual. This is a key difference between this model and the pivot model, where the dependent nature is ultimately devoid of the imagined nature.
Divisions of consciousness and their relationship to the three natures
Different Yogācāra philosophers analyzed consciousness into various parts or divisions ( bhāga). According to Nanda, consciousness was divided into a seeing part ( darśana-bhāga) and a seen, or image part ( nimitta-bhāga). Dignāga accepted a third part, the self-cognizing part ( svasaṃvitti-bhāga), which refers to consciousness' reflexive knowing within any act of cognition. Dharmapāla added to this yet a fourth part, the cognition of self-cognition, which is the resulting awareness that one is self-aware.Bhikku KL Dhammajoti, in Lodrö Sangpo, G. et al. (trans.) (2017). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā by Xuanzang, Part 1, page. 34 (The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin). Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, pages 145-146, Routledge, 2005
Emptiness
The central meaning of emptiness ( śūnyatā) in Yogācāra is a twofold "Nondualism." The first element of this is the unreality of any conceptual duality such as "physical" and "non-physical", "self" and "other". To define something conceptually is to divide the world into what it is and what it is not, but the world is a causal flux that does not accord with conceptual constructs. The second element of this is a perceptual duality between the sensorium and its objects, between what is "external" and "internal", between subject ( grāhaka, literally "grasper") and object ( grāhya, "grasped").Skilton, Andrew (1994). A Concise History of Buddhism. Windhorse Publications, London:. pg 124 This is also an unreal superimposition, since there is really no such separation of inner and outer, but an interconnected causal stream of mentality which is falsely divided up.
Disagreement with Madhyamaka
Indian sources indicate that Yogācāra thinkers sometimes debated with the defenders of the Madhyamaka tradition.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 3. Oxford University Press. However, there is disagreement among contemporary Western and traditional Buddhist scholars about the degree to which they were opposed, if at all.:50f. The main difference between these schools was related to issues of existence and the nature of emptiness. The Chinese pilgrim Yijing (635–713) concisely summarized the differences thus: “For Yogācāra the real exists, but the conventional does not exist; and Yogācāra takes the three natures as foundational. For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist; and actually the two truths are primary".Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 133. Oxford University Press. Garfield and Westerhoff write that "Yogācāra is both ontologically and epistemologically Foundationalism; Madhyamaka is antifoundationalist in both senses." Another way to state this key difference is that Madhyamaka defends a "global Anti-realism" while Yogācāra "restricts the scope of their antirealism to the external and the conventional".
Mental images: true vs false
An important debate about the reality of mental appearances within Yogācāra led to its later subdivision into two systems of Alikākāravāda (Tib. rnam rdzun pa, False Aspectarians, also known as Nirākāravāda) and Satyākāravāda ( rnam bden pa, True Aspectarians, also known as Sākāravāda). They are also termed "Aspectarians" ( ākāra) and "Non-Aspectarians" ( anākāra). The core issue is whether appearances or “aspects” ( rnam pa, ākāra) of objects in the mind are treated as true ( bden pa, satya) or false ( rdzun pa, alika).Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 8. While this division did not exist in the works of the early Yogācāra philosophers, tendencies similar to these views can be discerned in the works of Yogācāra thinkers like Dharmapāla (c. 530–561?) and Sthiramati (c. 510–570?).Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 73.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, pp. 149-150. Routledge, 2012.Kajiyama, Yuichi. “Controversy between the sakara- and nirakara-vadins of the Yogacara school-some materials.” Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 14 (1965): n. pag. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Controversy-between-the-sakara-and-nirakara-vadins-Kajiyama/655a1f561c18725188c0916ca05ec334b5f9f7cd According to Zhihua Yao, Dharmapāla was a Sākāravādin, while Sthiramati was a Nirākāravādin.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, pages 149-150, Routledge, 2005
Although Yogācāras in general do not accept the existence of an external material world, according to Satyākāravāda its appearances or “aspects” ( rnam pa, ākāra) reflected in consciousness have a real existence, because they are of one nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to Alikākāravāda, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and/in the minds that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is only primordial mind ( ye shes, jñāna), described as self-cognition ( rang rig, svasamvedana/ svasamvitti) or individually self-cognizing primordial mind ( so so(r) rang gis rig pa’i ye shes).Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 73-74.
Davey K. Tomlinson describes the difference (with reference to later Yogacara scholars from Vikramashila) as follows:On one hand is the Nirākāravāda, typified by Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1045); on the other, the Sākāravāda, articulated by his colleague and critic Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1040). The Nirākāravādin argues that all appearances do not really exist. They are ersatz or false (alīka). Ephemeral forms appear to us but are the erroneous construction of ignorance, which fundamentally characterizes our existence as suffering beings in saṃsāra. In the ultimately real experience of an awakened buddha, no appearances show up at all. Pure experience, unstained by false appearance (which is nirākāra, “without appearance”), is possible. The Sākāravādin, on the other hand, defends the view that all conscious experience is necessarily the experience of a manifest appearance (consciousness is sākāra, or constitutively “has appearance”). Manifest appearances, properly understood, are really real. A buddha's experience has appearances, and there is nothing about this fact that makes a buddha's experience mistaken.
Karma
An explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of karma (action) is central to Yogācāra, and the school sought to explain important questions such as how moral actions can have effects on individuals long after that action was done, that is, how karmic causality works across temporal distances. Previous Abhidharma schools like the Sautrantika had developed theories of karma based on the notion of "seeds" ( bījā) in the mind stream, which are unseen karmic habits (good and bad) which remain until they meet with the necessary conditions to manifest. Yogācāra adopts and expanded this theory. Yogācāra then posited the "storehouse consciousness" as the container of the seeds, as the storage place for karmic latencies and as a fertile matrix of predispositions that bring karma to a state of fruition. In the Yogācāra system, all experience without exception is said to result from karma or mental intention ( cetana), either arising from one's own subliminal seeds or from other minds.
Meditation and awakening
As the name of the school suggests, meditation practice is central to the Yogācāra tradition. Yogācāra texts prescribe various yogic practices such as mindfulness and the four investigations, out of which a revolutionary and radically transformative understanding of the non-duality of self and other is said to arise. This process is referred to as āśraya-parāvṛtti ("overturning the cognitive basis", or "revolution of the basis"), which refers to "overturning the conceptual projections and imaginings which act as the base of our cognitive actions." This event is seen as the transformation of the basic mode of cognition into Jnana (knowledge, direct knowing), which is seen as a non-dual knowledge that is non-conceptual ( nirvikalpa), i.e., "devoid of interpretive overlay".Williams, 2008, p. 95. Roger R. Jackson describes this as a "'fundamental unconstructed awareness' ( mūla-nirvikalpa-jñāna)"."How Mystical is Buddhism?" by Roger R. Jackson Asian Philosophy, Vol. 6, No.2, 1996 pg 150 When this knowledge arises, the eight consciousnesses come to an end and are replaced by direct knowings. According to Lusthaus:Overturning the Basis turns the five sense consciousnesses into immediate cognitions that accomplish what needs to be done ( kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna). The sixth consciousness becomes immediate cognitive mastery ( pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna), in which the general and particular characteristics of things are discerned just as they are. This discernment is considered nonconceptual ( nirvikalpa-jñāna). Manas becomes the immediate cognition of equality ( samatā-jñāna), equalizing self and other. When the Warehouse Consciousness finally ceases it is replaced by the Great Mirror Cognition ( Mahādarśa-jñāna) that sees and reflects things just as they are, impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or distortion. The grasper-grasped relation has ceased. ..."purified" cognitions all engage the world in immediate and effective ways by removing the self-bias, prejudice, and obstructions that had prevented one previously from perceiving beyond one's own narcissistic consciousness. When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. Since enlightened cognition is nonconceptual its objects cannot be described.
Five Categories of Beings
One of the more controversial Yogācāra teachings was the "five categories of beings", which was an extension of the teachings on the seeds of the storehouse consciousness. This teaching states that sentient beings have certain innate seeds that determine their capability of achieving a particular state of enlightenment and no other. Thus, beings were placed into five categories:
Practice
A key early source for the yogic practices of Indian Yogācāra is the encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra (YBh , Shastra on the Foundation for Yoga Practitioners). The YBh presents a structured exposition of the Mahāyāna Buddhist path of yoga (here referring to spiritual practice in general) from a Yogācāra perspective and relies in both Āgama/Nikāya texts and Mahayana sutras while also being influenced by Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma.Timme Kragh 2013, pp. 16, 25-26, 30, 46. According to some scholars, this text can be traced to communities of yogācāras, which initially referred not to a philosophical school, but to groups of meditation specialists whose main focus was Buddhist yoga.Timme Kragh 2013, p. 31. Other Yogācāra texts which also discuss meditation and spiritual practice (and show some relationship with the YBh) include the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Madhyāntavibhāga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga and Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha.Timme Kragh 2013, p. 34.
Bodhisattva path
Yogācāra sources like the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Chéng Wéishì Lùn and the commentaries to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra also contain various descriptions of the main stages of the bodhisattva path.Brunnholzl, Karl (trans.), Asanga. (2019) A Compendium of the Mahayana: Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha and Its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, Appendix 10. Shambhala Publications. These Yogācāra sources integrate the Mahayana teaching of the ten bodhisattva stages (bhūmis) with the earlier Abhidharma outline of the path called the "five paths" ( pañcamārga), to produce a Mahayanist version of "five stages" (pañcāvasthā).Muller, Charles. Five stages of cultivating the Yogâcāra path 唯識修道五位, Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, 2006 In classic Yogācāra, this bodhisattva path is said to last for three incaculable eons (asaṃkhyeya kalpas), i.e. millions upon millions of years.Watanabe, Chikafumi, A Study of Mahayanasamgraha III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories, p. 66. University of Calgary, 2000.
Bodhisattva practice
The Bodhisattvabhūmi discusses the Yogācāra school's specifically Mahāyāna forms of practice which are tailored to .Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 884-885. The aim of the bodhisattva's practice in the Bodhisattvabhūmi is the wisdom ( Prajnaparamita) which realizes of the inexpressible Ultimate Reality ( tathata) or the 'thing-in-itself ( vastumatra), which is essenceless and beyond the duality ( advaya) of existence ( bhāva) and non-existence ( abhāva).Kragh 2013, p. 157.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 889-891.
The four investigations and four correct cognitions
The four investigations (catasraḥ paryeṣaṇāḥ) and the corresponding four correct cognitions (catvāri yathābhūtaparijñānāni) are a set of original contemplations found in Yogācāra works. These were seen as very important contemplative methods by the authors of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. They were considered to lead to awakening, and were linked with the thirty-seven factors leading to Awakening.
The practice which leads to the realization of the true nature of things is based on the elimination of all conceptual proliferations ( prapañca) and ideations ( saṃjñā) that one superimposes on true reality .Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 896-897. The YBh states that the yogin must "repeatedly remove any ideation conducive to the proliferation directed at all phenomena and should consistently dwell on the thing-in-itself by a non-conceptualizing mental state which is focused on grasping only the object perceived without any characteristics".Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 897-898.
This process is conceisely explained in the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa which says "through the observation of it being merely mind, a knowable object is not observed. Through not observing a knowable object, mind is not observed either. Through not observing both, the dharmadhātu is observed."Brunnholzl, Karl (2009). Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p. 24. Snow Lion Publications. Thus, the goal of meditation is a totally unified mind that goes beyond all concepts and language to directly know the undifferentiated "uniformity of phenomena" (dharmasamatāḥ) and the thing-in-itself, the supreme reality. The elimination of all concepts applies even to the very idea of mind only or "mere-cognizance" itself.Brunnholzl, Karl (2009). Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p. 25. Snow Lion Publications. As the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga states: "through referents being observed in this way, they are observed as mere cognizance. By virtue of observing them as mere cognizance, Referents are not observed, and through not observing referents, mere cognizance is not observed either."Brunnholzl, Karl (2009). Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, pp. 23-24. Snow Lion Publications. This elimination of concepts and ideas is the basic framework applied by the bodhisattva to all meditative practices, including the different Satipatthana meditations . The three samādhis (meditative absorptions) are likewise adapted into this new framework. These three are the emptiness ( śūnyatā), wishlessness ( apraṇihita), and imagelessness ( ānimitta) samādhis.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 898-899.
While insight meditation is initially based on conceptual reflection, these are gradually abandoned at later stages until the yogin lets go of all concepts, teachings, and mental images. Furthermore, at the higher stages of meditation, the calm and insight meditations must ultimately be blended or yoked together (yuganaddha) in a single state of one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā). This unified state is described as that state in which the yogin: "realises that these images (pratibimba) which are the domain of concentration (samādhigocara) are nothing but representation (vijñaptimātra), and having realised this, he contemplates (manasikaroti) Suchness (tathatā)."
The early layers of the massive Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra ( Treatise on the Stages of the Yogācāras) also contains very ancient Yogācāra material which is earlier than the Saṃdhinirmocana. However, in its current form it is a "conglomeration of heterogenous materials" (Schmithausen) which was finally compiled (perhaps by Asanga) after the Saṃdhinirmocana (hence, later layers quote the sutra directly). Modern scholars consider the Yogācārabhūmi to contain the work of several authors (mainly of a Mulasarvastivada milieu), though it has traditionally been attributed in full to the bodhisattva Maitreya or to Asanga.M. Delhey, ‘The Yogācārabhūmi Corpus: Sources, Editions, Translations, and Reference Works’. 2013.Kragh, U.T. (editor), The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Volume 1, p. 312 . Harvard University, Department of South Asian studies, 2013. It is influenced by Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Sautrāntika traditions, who also had similar texts called by the name "Yogācārabhūmi", such as the Yogācārabhūmi of Saṅgharakṣa.Deleanu, F. (Ed.). (2006). The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamārga): A Trilingual Edition(Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation and Introductory Study (2 vol), pp. 157-18. Tokyo:International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
Modern scholars argue that the various works traditionally attributed to Maitreya are actually by other authors. According to Mario D'amato, the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra and the Madhyāntavibhāga are part of a second phase of Yogācāra scholarship which took place after the completion of the Bodhisattvabhumi, but before the composition of Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (which quotes the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra as an authoritative text).D’AMATO, M. “THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGĀCĀRA ‘TRISVABHĀVA’-THEORY.” Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185–207. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23497001. Accessed 16 Feb. 2024. Regarding the Abhisamayalankara and the Ratnagotravibhaga, modern scholars generally see these as the works of different authors.Makransky, John J. Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet SUNY Press, 1997, p. 187.Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, Routledge, 1989, p. 103.
Asaṅga went on to write many of the key Yogācāra treatises such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. Asaṅga also went on to convert his brother Vasubandhu to Yogācāra. Vasubandhu was a top scholar of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika Abhidharma thought, and the Abhidharmakośakārikā is his main work which discusses the doctrines of these traditions.Gold, Jonathan, Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu's Unifying Buddhist Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 2. Vasubandhu also went on to write important Yogācāra works like the Twenty Verses and the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only.
Thus, the three main branches of the Yogācāra movement which developed during the so called middle period are:Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 17-20. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).
The doctrines of the exegetical tradition sometimes came under attack by other Buddhists, especially the notion of ālaya-vijñāna, which was seen as close to the Hindu ideas of ātman and prakṛti. It was perhaps due to this that the logical tradition shifted over time to using the term citta-santāna instead , since it was easier to defend a "stream" (santāna) of thoughts as a doctrine that did not contradict Anatta. By the end of the eighth century, the scholastic tradition had mostly become eclipsed by the pramāṇa tradition as well as by a new hybrid school that "combined basic Yogācāra doctrines with Buddha-nature thought."
The influential Pramāṇavāda tradition led by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti defined the main epistemological method for Indian Buddhism. Modern scholars see this school as having ushered in an "epistemological turn" for all Indian philosophy.Dreyfus, Georges B. J. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, Suny, 1997, pp. 15-16. The pramāṇa tradition continued to thrive in Magadha (especially at Nalanda) as well as in Kashmir well into the 11th century. One of the most important late figures of this tradition was Śaṅkaranandana (fl. c. 9th or 10th century), "the second Dharmakīrti"."Śaṅkaranandana" in Silk, Jonathan A (editor in chief). Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism Volume II: Lives.
The synthesis of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought became extremely influential in both East Asia and Tibet. During the sixth and seventh centuries, various forms of competing Yogācāra systems were popular in Chinese Buddhism. The translator Bodhiruci (6th century CE) for example, took a more "classical" approach while Ratnamati was attracted to Tathāgatagarbha thought and sought to translate texts like the Dasabhumika commentary accordingly. Their disagreement on this issue led to the end of their collaboration as co-translators.Brunnholzl, Karl , When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, Shambhala Publications, 2015, p. 117. The translator Paramartha is another example of a hybrid thinker. He promoted the theory of a "stainless consciousness" ( amala-vijñāna, a pure wisdom within all beings, i.e. the tathāgatagarbha), which is revealed once the ālaya-vijñāna is purified.Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Routledge, 2014, p. 274.
According to Lusthaus, Xuanzang's travels to India and his translation work was an attempt to return to a more "orthodox" and "authentic" Indian Yogācāra, and thus put to rest the debates and confusions in the Chinese Yogācāra of his time. The Cheng Weishi Lun returns to the use of the theory of seeds instead of the tathāgatagarbha to explain how some beings can reach Buddhahood.Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Routledge, 2014, pp. 8-10. However, by the eighth century, the Yogācāra-tathāgatagarbha synthesis became the dominant interpretation of Yogācāra in East Asian Buddhism. Later Chinese thinkers like Fazang would thus criticize Xuanzang for failing to teach the tathāgatagarbha.
Karl Brunnhölzl notes that this syncretic tendency also existed in Indian Yogācāra scholasticism, but that it only became widespread during the later tantric era (when Vajrayana became prominent) with the work of thinkers like Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnākaraśānti, and Maitripada.Brunnholzl, Karl , When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, Shambhala Publications, 2015, p. 118. Kashmir also became an important center for this tradition, as can be seen in the works of Kashmiri Yogacarins Sajjana and Mahājana.Kano, Kazuo. "Sajjana and Mahājana: Yogācāra Exegeses in the Eleventh Century Kashmir." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu ( Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 69, no. 2 (2021): 118–124
The harmonizing tendency can be seen in the work of philosophers like Kambala (5-6th century, author of the Ālokamālā), Jñānagarbha (8th century), his student Śāntarakṣita (8th century) and Ratnākaraśānti (c. 1000). Śāntarakṣita (8th century), whose view was later called "Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka" by the Tibetan tradition, saw the Mādhyamika position as ultimately true and at the same time saw the Yogācāra view as a useful way to relate to conventional truth (which leads one to the ultimate).Shantarakshita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp.117-122 Ratnākaraśānti on the other hand saw Nagarjuna as agreeing with the intent of Yogācāra texts, while criticizing the interpretations of later Madhyamikas like Bhaviveka. Later Tibetan Buddhist thinkers like Sakya Chokden would also work to show the compatibility of the alikākāravāda sub-school with Madhyamaka, arguing that it is in fact a form of Madhyamaka.Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 10. Likewise, the Seventh Karmapa Chödrak Gyamtso has a similar view which holds that the "profound important points and intents" of the two systems are one.Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 81. Ju Mipham is also another Tibetan philosopher whose project is aimed as showing the harmony between Yogacara and Madhyamaka, arguing that there is only a very subtle difference between them, being a subtle clinging by Yogacaras to the existence of an "inexpressible, naturally luminous cognition" ( rig pa rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba).Komarovski, Yaroslav , Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 80.
Xuanzang (fl. c. 602 – 664) is famous for having made a dangerous journey to India in order to study Buddhism, obtain more indic Yogācāra sources.Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. 2006. p. 220 Xuanzang spent over ten years in India traveling and studying under various Buddhist masters and drew on a variety of Indian sources in his studies.Wei Tat. Cheng Weishi Lun. 1973. p. li Upon his return to China, Xuanzang brought with him 657 Buddhist texts, including the Yogācārabhūmi and began the work of translating them. Xuanzang composed the Cheng Weishi Lun ( Discourse on the Establishment of Consciousness Only) which drew on many Indian sources and commentaries and became a central work of East Asian Yogācāra.Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. 2006. p. 221
Xuanzang's student Kuiji continued this tradition, writing several important commentaries. However, another student of Xuanzang, the Korean monk Woncheuk, defended some of the doctrines of the Shelun school of Paramārtha, for which he was criticized by the followers of Kuiji. Wŏnch’ŭk's teachings were influential on the Yogācāra ( Beopsang) of Silla Korea. Both of these competing Yogācāra sub-sects were then imported to Japan where they became the two sub-sects (the northern and southern temple lineages) of the Hossō school.Green, Ronald S. (2020). Early Japanese Hosso in Relation to Silla Yogacara in Disputes between Nara's Northern and Southern Temple Traditions. Journal of Korean Religions, 11(1), 97–121. doi:10.1353/jkr.2020.0003 Xuanzang's school later came under criticism from later Chinese masters like Fazang and it became less influential as the fortunes of other native Chinese schools rose. After Zhizhou, the fourth generation disciple of Xuanzang, no clear record of the Yogācāra lineage is available, and the tradition is considered to have become extinct soon after. Nevertheless, Yogācāra studies continued to be important at different times throughout Chinese history, including during the Five Dynasties through the synthesis of Yongming Yanshou, and the Ming dynasty Revival of Yogācāra Studies, as well as the modern revival of Yogācāra in the 20th century.Makeham, John. Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China, pp. 13-14. Oxford University Press, 2014
The Tibetan Nyingma school and its Dzogchen teachings draw on both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha thought.Germano, David F.; Waldron, William S. (2006), "A Comparison of Alaya-vijñāna in Yogacara and Dzogchen" (PDF), in Nauriyal, D. K.; Drummond, Michael S.; Lal, Y. B. (eds.), Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research: Transcending the boundaries, Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, pp. 36–68, Similarly, Kagyu school figures like the Third Karmapa also rely on the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha systems in their presentation of the ultimate view (termed Mahamudra in Kagyu).Brunnholzl, Karl. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, Introduction. Snow Lion Publications, The Nitartha Institute (2009). The Jonang school also developed its own synthetic philosophy which they termed shentong ("other-emptiness" ), which also included elements from Yogācāra, Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha. In contrast, the Gelug and Sakya schools generally see Yogācāra as a lesser view than the Madhyamaka philosophy of Chandrakirti, which is seen as the definitive view in these traditions.
Today, Yogācāra topics remain important in Tibetan Buddhism and Yogācāra texts are widely studied. There are various debates and discussions among the Tibetan Buddhist schools regarding key Yogācāra ideas, like svasaṃvedana (reflexive awareness) and the foundational consciousness. Furthermore, the debates between the other-emptiness and self-emptiness views are also similar in some ways to the historical debates between Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha and Madhyamaka, though the specific viewpoints have evolved further and changed in complex ways. Modern thinkers continue to discuss Yogācāra issues, and attempt to synthesize it with Madhyamaka. For example, Ju Mipham, the 19th-century Rimé commentator, wrote a commentary on Śāntarakṣita's synthesis arguing that the ultimate intent of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is the same.
Hindu philosophers such as Vācaspati Miśra, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and Shriharsha were also influenced by Yogacara ideas and responded to their theories in their own works.Torella, Raffaele. "The Pratyabhijñā and the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism" in Goudriaan ed. (1992) Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of Andre Padoux pp. 327-346. SUNY Press.Stcherbatsky, Fyodor Th. Buddhist Logic. Vol. I, p. 51. Dover Publications.
The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra also later assumed considerable importance in East Asia, and portions of this text were considered by Étienne Lamotte as being contemporaneous with the Saṃdhinirmocana.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti. Being as Consciousness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism, p. xiiFoundations of Buddhism, by Rupert Gethin. Oxford University Press: 1998. This text equates the Yogācāra theory of ālayavijñāna with the tathāgatagarbha (buddha-nature) and thus seems to be part of the tradition which sought to merge Yogācāra with tathāgatagarbha thought.Williams, 2008, p. 103. Another sutra which contains similar themes to the Laṅkāvatāra is the Ghanavyūha Sūtra.Harris, Ian Charles (1991). The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 78 . BRILL.
All these five sutras are listed by Kuiji as key sutras for the Yogācāra school in his Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun (成唯識 論述記; Taishō no. 1830). T1830 成唯識論述記 [T43.229c29-230a1], CBETA Another lesser known sutra which was important in East Asian Yogācāra is the Buddha Land Sutra ( Buddhabhūmi Sūtra; Taishō vol. 16, no. 680) which along with its commentaries, teaches that the pure land is not a physical place, but a symbol for wisdom.Keenan, John P. The Interpretation of the Buddha Land, BDK English Tripitaka, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation & Research, 2006. This sutra was important enough in India to have at least two Indian Yogācāra commentaries written on it, Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmi- vyākhyāna and Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.Keenan, John P. A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeś́a: The Doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought. Institute of Buddhist Studies and Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai America, 2014.
There are also various Indian, Chinese and Tibetan commentaries to these various Mahayana sutras. Furthermore, the Prajnaparamita are also important sources in Yogācāra, even though most do not cover specifically "Yogācāra" doctrines. This is shown by the fact that various Yogācāra commentaries were written on Prajñaparamita sutras, including commentaries by Asanga ( Vajracchedikākāvyākhyā), Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Daṃṣṭrasena ( Bṛhaṭṭīkā), Ratnākaraśānti (various), and the Abhisamayālaṅkāra.Makransky, John J. (1997). Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet, p. 10. SUNY. . — a study of interpretations of the Abhisamayalankara.Brunnhölzl, Karl (2014). "The Meditative Tradition of the Uttaratantra and Shentong". When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sūtra and Tantra. Boston: Snow Lion Publications. pp. 123–50.
Sankara, founder of the Advaita school, which holds a form of idealism, also was harshly critical of Yogacara.Sinha, Jadunath Indian Realism p. 149. Routledge, 2024.
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